Peace in Ukraine
Through the return to the principles of Realpolitik (Free)
The conflict in Ukraine, having passed the 1000-day mark, is approaching a very unpleasant stalemate, for all. Russian forces are pushing through the lines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which in some places seem to be in almost chaotic retreat. The situation calls for rapid actions to stop the conflict from spiraling out of control and escalating into World War III.
The war in Ukraine has also become highly emotionalized, due to the relentless war propaganda spewed especially by the European mainstream media. This has created something of an emotional blockade among politicians, making it difficult for them to engage in negotiations that would require both sides to compromise. The dominant narrative is that Ukraine must win, leaving little room for exploring other solutions to the conflict.
Regardless, the path to peace lies in return to realpolitik in Europe, that is, a return to political principles based on practical, not value-based or ideological, considerations. Essentially, there are six facts successful peace negotiations in Ukraine need to be based on:
In all non-nuclear military scenarios Russia will emerge as the victor in the Ukraine conflict.
Russia is unlikely to seek occupation of all of Ukraine.
Negotiations will have to fulfil (almost) all of Kremlin’s publicly declared goals, i.e. neutrality, limited military, territorial loss, non-membership in NATO but perhaps membership of the EU.
A credible force must be assigned to establish and monitor the line of ceasefire.
Due to a lack of mutual trust, all parties must commit to pre-agreement acts of de-escalation.
Post-war collapse of Ukraine must be prevented to avoid widespread and well-armed terrorism/banditry in the surrounding areas. Collapse will commence unless all parties commit to support Ukraine pre-agreement.
Pre-conditions for negotiations
Russia in Ukraine
There’s no denying that Russia is obliterating not just the AFU, but also Ukrainian society. Russian troops are advancing rapidly, and the air raids over the weekend of 16-17th of November 2024, implied that the Kremlin is ready to push Ukraine into darkness. Moreover, Russia struck the Ukrainian city of Dnipro with new hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) “Oreshnik” carrying a non-nuclear payload on early morning of 21st November. These entail that there is only one (non-nuclear) endgame in Ukraine: capitulation of the AFU, either through negotiated peace or surrender.
For these reasons, the path to peace needs to be sought from the original aims of Kremlin. The publicly stated aims of the Special Military Operation (SMO), which commenced on February 24, 2022, were four:
Defending the people of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics under the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
To clear “neo-Nazis” from Ukrainian leadership.
To stop the nuclear weapons program of Ukraine.
To stop and remove the NATO infrastructure being build, threatening Russia, from Ukraine.
In simplified terms, and as is widely known, the aim was a “demilitarization and denazification” of Ukraine. The term denazification is very elusive and it was probably used to draw sympathy from Russian citizens, by linking the SMO into the Great Patriotic War. It is quite unclear, whether there was a nuclear weapons program in Ukraine. This claim was likely aimed at Russian populace to provide further justification for the war. So, #1 and #4 can be considered as the actual aims of the Kremlin. There is where the path to peace lies.
It can also be assumed that the full collapse and occupation of Ukraine is not something the Kremlin is seeking either. The costs of the annexation of Crimea in early 2014 to Russia’s fiscal balance were staggering. The economic foundations, including tourism and private businesses, on the Peninsula collapsed and Russia emptied her Sovereign Reserve Fund to pay for the costs of annexation. The second military phase of the conflict has close to halved the size of the National Wealth Fund, with its value falling by $79 billion since February 2022, despite rising energy prices. The Kremlin simply cannot first destroy most of Ukraine in a war and then hold and rebuild it, because this would collapse Russian state finances.
Goals of Kreml and the line of ceasefire
The stated aims of the SMO listed above imply that Russia is seeking for the neutrality of Ukraine (from NATO), its limited military capacity and territorial annexation of Eastern Ukraine, more specifically Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblast, mostly inhabited by ethnic Russians. Russia unilaterally declared an annexation of these areas, but did not set their exact boundaries, which would be “defined later”, on September 30, 2022. This implies that the area-concession were not carved in stone and would most likely depend on a set of other factors, including how strong the Kremlin sees the commitment of the U.S. to the neutrality of Ukraine to be.
Because Russia is dominating the developments on the battlefield, peace needs to be made on the terms of Kremlin. If this is not accepted, Kreml can push the AFU to unconditional surrender effectively leading to the same end-result, but with more dire implications for the West.
The stability of the cease-fire and establishing the buffer-zone between the AFU and Russian forces is paramount. The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation) mission to eastern Ukraine, between March 2014 and March 2022, was a failure with the mission failing to objectively report on developments on the ground and to stop the war from escalating. Both the current Russian and the forthcoming U.S. administration have had serious reservations towards the United Nations. Yet, mostly due to this, it’s likely to be the only entity in the world that can effectively establish and control the buffer-zone and ceasefire. This is because under the U.N. neither side, the U.S./NATO or Russia, would have any direct control on the mission, which would report to the Security Council, where all major nuclear nations would monitor the ceasefire and creation of the buffer-zone. This would be the best shot for establishing an objective oversight of the line of ceasefire.
Rebuilding trust through pre-agreement acts of de-escalation
The Russo-Ukrainian war sowed division within Europe and between Russia and NATO/U.S. The war propaganda in Europe created hostilities towards Russia and Russians. In the propaganda of the Kremlin, this was used to justify the aggression towards Ukraine and question the motives of the West.
The deepening involvement of NATO in Ukraine has been a driving force of escalation. It was a generally held view, prior the Russo-Ukrainian war, that no country involved to an armed conflict could be taken as a member of NATO. Yet, with Ukraine something changed, with the NATO leadership effectively “annexing” Ukraine. On February 24, 2024, the former Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, even stated that “Ukraine will join NATO. It is not a question of if, but of when”. The new Secretary General, Mark Rutte, has continued on the same line of argumentation.
The strikes of the AFU on Russian early-warning systems (over-the-horizon radars) operating in Krasnodar Krai near Ukraine, and in Orenburg region near Orsk some 1500 km from Ukraine, during this year, were extremely sinister actions of escalation. The radars had no role in the conflict of Ukraine, with the radar in Orsk not even looking in the direction of Ukraine. The strikes of the AFU were conventional strikes on nuclear forces and command and control systems, which Russia listed as one of the conditions for nuclear weapons usage. Fortunately, Kreml did not react.
The fact also is that the war in Ukraine should have stopped in late spring of 2022. At that point the Kremlin had reached most of its stated goals of the SMO. Peace negotiations held in Istanbul, Turkey, in March/April 2022 were reported to have reached an agreement of truce before the U.S. and the U.K. allegedly stepped in and effectively stopped the peace process. During the summer of 2024, Ukraine and the West were also signaling willingness for a peaceful resolution, which were cautiously welcomed by the Kremlin. Then, in August 2024, the AFU invaded the Kursk region in Russia. Moreover, the Minsk agreements, signed in September 2014 and February 2015 officially aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine, were actually used just to buy time to arm Ukraine against Russia.
For these reasons, trust between the parties needs to be re-built. Pre-agreement acts of de-escalation should include:
Russia limiting her military presence to ceded areas and evacuates attack systems to sufficient distance from borders (established line of ceasefire) of the remaining Ukraine. Russia also commits to avoid further use of arms in Europe, to participate in the rebuilding of Ukraine and declares willingness to renewed trade if sanctions are lifted.
The EU and the US stop all deliveries of weapons and volunteers to Ukraine immediately and declare willingness to deactivate economic sanctions.
The U.S. and Russia announce their commitment on the independence and neutrality of (remaining) Ukraine.
The EU and the U.S. agree on an emergency economic support package for the (remaining) Ukraine.
The U.S. informs that the current leadership of NATO will be changed, and that NATO will go through a rigorous audit concerning its actions and policies.
Prevention of post-war collapse of Ukraine
The economy and society of Ukraine has become severely damaged. The war has eaten through whole age cohorts, while the infrastructure of Ukraine has taken a serious hit (which is worsening by the day). As a result, living standards will be low for an extended time and powerful weapons will be easily available for the inhabitants. If the Ukrainian economy and society would be allowed to collapse, Europe would see another wave of migration, with many of the refugees carrying deadly weapons. For this reason, both the U.S. but especially the EU needs to commit to economic support and rebuilding.
Most importantly, also for the peace process, the situation in post-war Ukraine must be prevented from becoming chaotic (causing severe problems in the surrounding areas). The keys to this would be:
The US and the EU need to undertake food, shelter and healthcare provisions in any needed quantities immediately on conclusion of the hostilities. A foreign run police or a paramilitary force needs to be established to keep order and collect unregistered arms.
The US and the EU take responsibility for repairing and rebuilding Ukraine housing and infrastructure. During the peace negotiations plans should be drawn up on the timing and distribution of work. Russia naturally takes care of rebuilding the parts of Ukraine it annexed, but could take a part in the re-building of western Ukraine as a sign of good-will.
Ukraine itself needs to establish new, neutral/accepted authorities as well as routines and policies for the new government. General elections need to be held as soon as possible.
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank need to agree on long-term structural loans and restructuring of the current debt load of the federal government of Ukraine.
Conclusions
Conflict in Ukraine has been very destructive to Ukraine, but also to the European security structure. European leaders should have been able to stop the escalation already in 2013 and 2014, but they failed. The ‘void’ of European leadership became epitomized in the peace negotiations during the March and April 2022 torpedoed, reportedly, by the U.S. and U.K. War should have ended during the Spring of 2022, but it was let to continue and even escalate on reasons mostly unclear. Due to the failures of our leaders, we are at the brink of yet another continental war.
Peace in Ukraine and strengthening the European security structure can be achieved without pushing our continent into a cycle a re-armament, which has always presided a continental war. Realities on the ground need to be acknowledged alongside meeting the demands of Kremlin. Peace in Ukraine will not be easy, but we need it now more than ever.
This article was submitted for publication to The National Interest. Because there was no response for five business days, I deducted that, based on the submission guidelines of the TNI, article was free to publish.
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