We have seen a major (alleged) leak of classified documents from the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon) presenting, among other things, the situation and plans in Ukraine.
The serious efforts to ‘redact’ these leaks from, e.g., Twitter with mediocre success, at least partly speaks for the authenticity of the documents. Moreover, statements and actions by the U.S. and Ukrainian leadership also suggests that leaks are authentic. Still, it should be noted that there’s no way to confirming the authenticity of the leaks with 100% certainty. They may as well be a part of a sophisticated misinformation campaign, while at current time this looks relatively unlikely.
If the leaks are authentic, as it currently seems, the situation in Ukraine is even more dire than what I suspected. We may thus have seen another round of the Pentagon Papers.
This new information, and the updated worst-case analysis it yields, also affects our risks analyses. This also means that this analysis will be for our (and mine) customers only. For those interested on the leaks in general, there are several free pieces going through them (just google). However, acknowledge that many of the documents have already been altered.
So, let’s dwell in.
It should be noted that the leaks could be a disinformation campaign from the U.S. (CIA, etc.) to create a false sense of security among Russian leadership in the ‘eve’ of the suspected Spring offensive of Armed Forces of Ukraine (from now on AFU). However, the leaks seem to include information, which would be simply harmful to the U.S.-NATO-Ukrainian alliance, like the number of NATO spy and intel assets operating in Ukraine. Presenting such data as “misinfo” would make no sense, because it would just confirm the Russian allegations that NATO is very actively operating on-ground in Ukraine.
But, what do the documents reveal?
I have been following a very interesting war-blogger Simplicius the Thinker for few months (from late January). I naturally cannot guarantee that he/she/them not to be a Russian asset, but their analyses have been very objective, taking views on both sides, and they have accurately predicted many of the developments on the ground, like the slow decline of AFU in Bakhmut and the now-reported Russian/Ukrainian losses. I think he/she/they has the best and most trusted breakdown of the leaks I’ve seen. Thus, I cite mostly him/her/them with the numbers here.
Losses and troop sizes
First, the original documents put the Russian losses in the range of 35-45k killed in action (KIA). This is a rather strong contrast to the 200k+ KIA floated in the media and shown in the latter versions of the documents, which also almost certainly are altered. Also, if the 200k+ figure would hold true, I am certain the Putin administration would be engaged in a mad-scramble to conscript more troops. This is not happening, which indicates that the 200k+ KIA figure for Russians is a propaganda operation.
The documents state that AFU KIA would be in the range of 16-17.5k. Like I explained before, I do not trust this figure at all, and if the leaks are real, it rises a question what is the source of Pentagon? They seem to copy the numbers provided by Ukrainian officials, which is strange. The reason for this could be that they do not want to present their own estimates to the U.S. leadership, because they could show a demoralizingly high number. However, on this we can only speculate.
The number of troops shown by the leaks in the different part of the Ukrainian theatre are also somewhat confusing. One document indicates there would be 10-20k total AFU forces, and 23,050 Russian forces in the Donetsk section, and 15,250-30,500 AFU, and 29,000 total Russian/Wagner in the Bakhmut axis. These sound like reasonable figures. However, if Russia would have lost 200k+ men, how their engaged troops could stand at 150k+, which is the number the documents state? 200k original + 300k conscripted gives 500k men from which a lion’s share is part of supportive actions. Russia’s army would in a state of utter collapse with Kremlin sitting on its hands, while it has still close to 2 million men in reserve. It makes no sense.
When you take a look at the number of brigades, the picture clears. According to the documents, Russia currently has 544 battalions with 527 committed to the conflict. Russian battalion is usually thought to consist of 800+ men. This gives a raw estimated of 435k Russian troops in the conflict, with maybe around 175k of “bayoner-strength” (engaged) troops (the estimate of the Thinker). The number of combat-ready reserves on the Russian side is unclear.
Documents state that Ukraine would have 34 maneuver brigades, which have at max 5000 men each, and 27 territorial defense forces brigades with lesser training an equipment. It’s rumored that most of AFU brigades would operate at only 50% capacity, which would give a range of 150k-300k+ total forces for Ukraine. This also seems reasonable.
Ukrainian spring offensive?
The documents show that Ukraine can field a total of 12 credible brigades for the spring offensive, which at most represents 60,000 troops. This, for example, is a lower figure than what reportedly participated on the Kherson offensive in September. The difference is that these brigades will be armed with the latest NATO gear. The Spring Offensive, if it comes, will thus be an actual NATO troops vs. Russian troops engagement (first ever actually).
Most of the brigades seem to have been in training from January till the end of March, which means that AFU starts to be ready for the spring offensive. However, the number of battle tanks seems to be really low with, e.g., only 32 Leopard 2A6:s. Much of the tanks involved seems to be from Soviet Era (T-64’s, original T-72’s), older western equipment, like Leopard 2A4’s (32) and lighter western equipment, like M2 Bradley's. This is not a formidable force.
Most worryingly, the documents indicate that AFU’s ammunition stockpiles, especially those relating to air defense, are dwindling fast. At current rates, the documents suggest that most of the air defense systems, including western NASAM and Iris-T systems and Soviet era S-300 and BUK units, would run out of ammo by April/May. This implies that Ukraine would have till May to launch the spring offensive, with a force that does not look so formidable. President Zelenskyi stated late-March that Ukrainian counter-offensive does not start before western countries send more weapons.
The updated worst-case scenario
During the Vietnam war, there was a massive leak of classified documents called the Pentagon Papers, or the MacNamara report, referring to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who ordered the leaked study . The documents essentially revealed that the U.S. was losing the war. They were leaked by a military analyst, and activist, Daniel Elsberg. In his memoir, published in 2002, Dr. Elsberg stated:
To say that we had "interfered" in what is "really a civil war," as most American academic writers and even liberal critics of the war do to this day, simply screened a more painful reality and was as much a myth as the earlier official one of "aggression from the North." In terms of the UN Charter and of our own avowed ideals, it was a war of foreign aggression, American aggression.
The leak (leaker) may the same purpose. That is, to reveal the actual nature of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and that it has not been going as has been been presented to the public in general. I have speculated on these in my previous entries on the worst-case scenario for the war (see the latest).
One of the main reasons, why I will not make my thoughts about the war publicly anymore is the smearing campaigns they have led to. I take it as personal insult to describe me as a “Putinist”, while my family (on mother’s side) has lost both land and men (one dead, several wounded) fighting the Russians. I follow the guideline of my grandfather, who fought in both wars (the Winter War and the Continuation War), which goes: Always strive for peace [with Russia], but if they come again, be ready. I see Finland joining the NATO as a dire escalation, which is likely to take our country into another war. I hope that whoever leaked the Pentagon Papers (part II), has the same aim. We have to view actions and the situation as they are, not how we would like them to be. We need to return to objectivity and reality, and that’s where I’ve been aiming throughout my life.
Alas, my new worst-case scenario for the war in Ukraine is as follows. Ukraine will launch a “last hurrah” spring offensive in May. As the AFU troops are seriously outnumbered, the attack will fail. Russia will then launch it’s summer offensive, against out-armored, out-numbered and out-of-morale AFU troops in June/July, leading to a collapse of the AFU and Blitzkrieg -type over-run of Ukrainian positions. This would be met, by a NATO invasion led by Poland from the west leading to a cutting of Ukraine in half most likely along the river Dnieper.
If we would see such an action in June, it could coincide with the first effects of a credit crunch, which we suspect is currently ongoing. The effects of such a combination of events to financial markets could be devastating. We return to this in more detail later.
However, all the above is, again, speculation, but trom the Russian perspective, this also makes sense. Their plan may have been to ‘wear out’ the AFU and strike only after if peace, in Kremlin’s terms, is not reached. Winter offensive did come, maybe because Bakhmut did not fall fast enough (strong Ukrainian resistance) and/or maybe because the Kremlin decided to weaken Ukraine and its allies further. What truly worries me, however, is the seeming calm of Kremlin.
What we learned from our two wars with Russia is that, if they (Russian leadership) are calm and quiet, be very wary of what comes next (the uneasy calm in our fronts in 1940 and 1944 ended with massive Russian offensives forcing Finland to accept peace with heavy terms). Thus, I urge not to take this calm as a sign of thing settling down, because it’s likely to be exact opposite.
Again, I hope I am wrong, but worry that I am not.
Disclaimer:
The information contained herein is current as at the date of this entry. The information presented here is considered reliable, but its accuracy is not guaranteed. Changes may occur in the circumstances after the date of this entry and the information contained in this post may not hold true in the future.
No information contained in this entry should be construed as investment advice. GnS Economics nor Tuomas Malinen cannot be held responsible for errors or omissions in the data presented. Readers should always consult their own personal financial or investment advisor before making any investment decision, and readers using this post do so solely at their own risk.
Readers must make an independent assessment of the risks involved and of the legal, tax, business, financial or other consequences of their actions. GnS Economics nor Tuomas Malinen cannot be held i) responsible for any decision taken, act or omission; or ii) liable for damages caused by such measures.