The Russo-Ukrainian war V
Finland, the missing piece (Free)
This week, I participated in the MCC Peace Forum in Budapest. The lineup of speakers, in addition to myself, included notable scholars, like Professor Jeffrey Sachs from Columbia University, Professor Max Abrahms from Northeastern University and George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy at Quincy Institute. The conference took place at the same time, when Ukrainian forces started their long-awaited counter-offensive. First reports from it are, somewhat unsurprisingly, not encouraging for Ukraine.
In addition, there was the very unfortunate and destructive demolition or collapse of the Kakhovka dam in southeastern Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia are naturally blaming each other from it, and arguments can be made for both sides benefitting from it in some way. Propaganda machines have been running hot, of late.
I would also like to add that I am very delighted that my original worst-case scenario for Russo-Ukrainian war has not manifested, at least yet. Russian reserves have stayed in the ‘reserve’, while the mercenary group Wagner has made the “heavy lifting” in, for example, in Bakhmut, which has fallen into full control of Russian forces, as expected. Now, we have to wait and see how the Ukrainian counteroffensive goes, and what Russia does after.
Considering all the above, I thought it would be a good time to continue my series on the worst-case scenario of the Russo-Ukrainian war. I also like to note that we are currently going through the latest banking data to find the most vulnerable and the most trustworthy U.S. banks. We are to likely start to publish our findings next week in GnS Economics Newsletter, a topic which I will comment also here.
Enter Finland
I have speculated on the role of Finland in NATO in a piece published in the Epoch Times (after Foreign Affairs respectfully rejected it) earlier. Now, as Finland has become a full-member of the alliance, I will speculate on the situation a bit further.
Because most European armies are in dire straits, Finland is essential for the success of any military campaign against Russia. Ukrainian forces are also becoming depleted of the men Ukraine is able to master and equipment the West is able to provide. So, in the worst-case, if the Ukrainian counter-offensive fails, NATO (the U.S.) could be aiming for opening another front, preferably with highly trained army, and so enter Finland.
In March, Finnish parliament voted, with an over-whelming majority of 184 to 7, in favor of Finland’s ascension as a full-member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Finland became a full member on 4 April, 2023, which is also the anniversary of NATO (the alliance was created on 4 April, 1949). I am rather certain that this was no coincidence. We can naturally just speculate on the ‘signal value’ of choosing such a day to ascend Finland, but it may be a sign that NATO leaders consider that the alliance is finally completed.
If so, for what purpose, is the pressing question?
At this point it should be perfectly clear to everyone that NATO is not just “an alliance for peace”. It actually never was, as I have detailed in my previous entry. Finland could also take a role in chasing this.
Finland is a notable military power
In relation to the size of the country, Finland commands a formidable military force. We have the largest artillery in western Europe, with around 700 cannons, 700 heavy mortars and around 100 multiple rocket launchers. We have 100 Leopard 2A6 and 139 Leopard 2A4 battle tanks. We also have, e.g., 102 CV9030 and 110 MBP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. The war-time size our military is around 280 000 soldiers with over 500 000 men in reserve. Our military is well-equipped, well-trained and well-maintained. If there would be a war in Europe, Finland would play an important role, with her 1340km with Russia.
It naturally never was a question, which side Finland would choose in an European conflict. Like I wrote in the Epoch Times:
The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, or ”YYA,” signed on April 6, 1948, cemented Finland’s position. It agreed to remain outside alliances and to treat Germany or any of its allies threatening Russia (the Soviet Union) through its territory as an enemy and defend itself “as an independent nation.” The agreement kept Finland outside the Warsaw Pact and also initially outside Western organizations.
We were neutral, but definitely leaning towards the West. Our centuries long 'skirmishes’ had taught us that Russian leadership cannot be trusted, without a strong enough leverage.
Moreoverf (rom the Epoch Times):
Presidents Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen formulated a policy line of passive neutrality called the Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine in the 1950s. While the Paris Peace Treaty limited the size of Finland’s military for some time after World War II, Finland systematically built up her army to be able to counter any further Soviet Union aggression. The policy was a great success, with Finland strengthening its independence while trade with the Soviet Union, whose international trade was heavily sanctioned by several Western governments, grew rapidly, feeding Finland’s economic growth. Its military policy was aimed at creating a credible threat to counter or at least inflict heavy damage on any Soviet (or other) aggression. The Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine made possible a peaceful and prosperous co-existence with the Soviet Union.
However, our current leadership, most notably President Sauli Niinistö and our out-going Prime Minister Sanna Marin, drastically and possibly fatefully changed this. When Finland was hurdled towards the full-membership in NATO, not a single public discourse was conducted acknowledging that NATO was effectively in a war against our eastern neighbor. To me this tells that Finland’s membership in NATO was decided already some time ago by people above our democratic control (some of our politicians have even publicly hinted to this). Again, to what end, is the question.
The Eurasian threat
The most plausible explanation I’ve read on the reasons behind the war concern the role of the Eurasian (Europe, Russia, Far East) unification. As noted by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most influential political scholars in the U.S. history, in 1997:
It follows that a wider Europe and an enlarged NATO will serve well both the short-term and the longer-term goals of U.S. policy. A larger Europe will expand the range of American influence without simultaneously creating a Europe politically so integrated that it could soon challenge the United States on geopolitical matters of high importance to America elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East.
According to Dr. Brzezinski, it should be the role of Europe to serve the U.S. interests, not its own. China, Europe and Russia were creating an economic powerhouse, and possibly even moving towards an alliance of sort, during the 2000’s. This would have risen to challenge American hegemony in the world. The ‘fly in the ointment’ was (is) Ukraine, a definite ‘redline’ of NATO enlargement for Russia.
So, the question becomes, did the U.S. administration, or the “deep state”, play this card (Ukraine) deliberately to dismantle Eurasian unification through another war in Europe? At this point, we can just speculate, but the ‘circumstancial evidence’ that it did is quite over-whelming (like I detailed previously). If it did, Finland’s role becomes even more crucial.
In addition to Ukraine, Finland is a critical piece in the European security structure. Both countries are also strategically very important, if one wants to wage a war against or to invade some part of Russia. In the latest such attempt, by Nazi Germany in 1941, both Finland and Ukraine supported the Nazis as an invading force. While Finland was attempting to liberate the territories lost in in the Winter War, many (western) Ukrainians fought for independence (according to Wikipedia).
Now, we are again in a situation, where both Finland and Ukraine are, effectively, enemies of Russia. Russia is ‘boxed in’.
Finland prepares
The civil defense of Finland has been upgraded and ramped up since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war. If that would not have been done, we would need to have question the ability of those in charge of our security, but there’s more.
I have received information from several credible sources that after Finland’s full-membership, preparations for war have accelerated. According to my sources, this includes putting reservists at Finland’s armored brigades to a “one week’s notice”, which means that they can called to service in one week’s notice. When I asked a friend, who is a reservist there, what this means, he replied that this is preparation for a war. There have also been reports of NATO equipment (mostly vehicles and tanks) transported to Finland.
A Senior Specialist at Regional State Administrative Agency for Eastern Finland stated in a public speech that “everyone here [national defense conference] understands that ‘war-actions’ will start soon also in Finland”. He also argued that because of this, we must make sure that we use this time to prepare accordingly. Later the statement has been labeled as a “misquote”, but the speech does not really give such an impression.
There are also reports of increased suspicious Russian activity in the eastern parts of Finland, and rumors that NATO equipment could be stored to old military bases in the east of Finland, but these are only rumors. In any case, something is definitely “up”.
What is the ‘endgame’?
It's plainly obvious that Finns will not agree to fight an invading war against our long-term neighbor. This means that the Finnish populace will not go to war against Russia, unless massively provoked. What could create such a situation?
President Putin has stated that:
But they [Finland and Sweden] must understand there was no threat before, while now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in kind and create the same threats for the territories from which threats towards us are created.
Worryingly, according to the info I have received, the NATO treaty of Finland does not include any causals prohibiting placing NATO troops or infrastructure to Finnish soil. This creates a cunning possibility to slowly and without much public discourse build a NATO presence in Finland to a level, which would force Russia to react. This would be a long road, but outside of a blatant ‘false flag’ operation, it would be the only way to force a response from Russia at a scale which would possibly push the Finnish populace into ‘war-footing’. It’s practical impossibility to assess the likelihood of such a worst-case scenario, but we can speculate.
Professor Jeffrey Sachs stated in his presentations in the Forum that NATO leaders (the U.S.) have, since early 1990’s, repeatedly stated that they will not push for further enlargement, but done the exact opposite. The public argument for it has been: “Don’t worry. We come at peace”. This, despite of NATO taking a role in several campaigns after 1992. And, like I detailed above, even the leading proponents of NATO’s enlargement, like Dr. Brzezinski, stated that the alliance should not try to, unilaterally, include Ukraine. Yet, also this is exactly what was done.
Finland naturally is a different kind of ‘animal’ than Ukraine, because we are a stable society and we have long, peaceful relationship with Russia. But we are also a military might, which all NATO -planners devising strategies against Russia want to include to the alliance. Essentially, now NATO has all the “pieces” for a campaign against Russia.
However, now that Finland is in the alliance, she could (should) use her strong position to pull NATO away from the path of escalation. De-escalate tensions with Russia and make a public and behind-the-scenes calls for peace in Ukraine. Easing of tensions between ‘East’ and ‘West’ has been the role of Finland for a long time, and we have been really good at it.
Unfortunately, considering how weak and ‘russophobic’ our current administration, including President Niinistö, currently are, this is unlikely to happen. That’s why I worry, quite a bit.
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