The Lost War

A short commentary to the Russo-Ukrainian war (Free)

Mar 23, 2024

You can find my latest interview, dealing with the geopolitical situation in Europe, war in Ukraine, the likelihood of (and route to) WWIII and the approaching Great Depression 2.0, from here.

Issues discussed:

Ukrainian losses are likely to be much higher than even I originally anticipated.
President Putin is likely to wait for a month or two to see how the West reacts.
The recent deranged comments, by many western leaders, greatly increases the likelihood that we are on a path to a nuclear confrontation.

Devastating Ukrainian losses

I saw a piece in X stating that, according to Kiev TV channel 1-1, over 1 million Ukrainian fighters would have been killed-in-action (KIA), missing-in-action (MIA) or being held as prisoners of war (POW). This was a reply to my own post, where I quoted a former chief of the Polish General Staff, General Rajmund Andrzejczak, who stated that:

According to my estimates, losses should be in the millions, not hundreds of thousands. The country has no resources, no one to fight. Ukrainians are losing this war.

Essentially, Ukraine is losing the war, because of horrific numbers of casualties, not because of lack of ammunition or artillery shells. I honestly hope, I would not have been so correct with my original worst-case scenario, where I speculated on the heavy losses of the Ukrainian side. In October, 2022, I continued to update the worst-case scenario with new figures on Ukrainian losses. Fortunately, the Russian winter-offensice, I also predicted, never came to reality. Actually, I don’t know was this a good thing, because it would have probably ended the war sooner, or led to a major escalation, also sooner probably resulting to a much lower casualty count.

Russians resorted to WWI tactics with trench warfare and devastatingly accurate and over-whelming shelling and aerial bombing campaigns. They started to produce massive amounts of artillery shells and invested heavily to drone technology. The combination of these, and cataclysmic mistakes of the leadership of the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) in battleground operations, led to devastating casualties on the Ukrainian side. The latest figures point to a possibility that the kill-rate has been 10-to-1, or even higher, in favor of Russians. There have also been many reports of the AFU leadership ordering relentless and extremely bloody ‘meat attacks’, where men (and eventually women) have been ordered to attack through a minefield under complete Russian aerial and artillery dominance. The statements above, on their part, corroborate such reports.

Besputitsa, but what then?

It’s likely that the whole western front of the AFU threatens to collapse. Ukraine is entering a mud season, or “roadlesness”, besputitsa (rasputitsa) or bezdorizhzhya, which renders all larger ground offensives impossible. This implies that frontlines will most likely stop moving for at least a month. However, what may come after is a major Russian offensive. Conditions for it would be rather optimal, for Russians with both Ukrainian resources and international support dwindling.

It seems that the AFU is on its last legs, which has been fully acknowledged in the west. This also explains the urgency of some European leaders to bring troops from NATO countries into Ukraine to stop it from collapsing altogether. I’ve also seen preliminary reports that Russia would have deployed hypersonic missile (Kinzhal) capabilities all through the southern border with Ukraine. This can act as a deterrent, but it can also be a part of preparation for a major offensive, most likely both.

It’s my assumption that Russia, and President Putin, will now wait and see what the West does during the besputitsa, while they prepare their troops and equipment for a major offensive. In my first worst-case scenario on the war, I noted that Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, from Brookings Institute, stated in their research on Vladimir Putin that:

The notion that Putin is an opportunist, at best an improviser, but not a strategist, is a dangerous misread. Putin thinks, plans, and acts strategically. But, as we have stressed in the book, for Putin, strategic planning is contingency planning. There is no step-by-step blueprint. There are strategic objectives, and there are many ways to achieve those objectives. Exactly what his next step towards the objective will be depends on the circumstances. It depends on how his adversary reacts.

This makes me think that President Putin will wait how the West reacts on the impending collapse of the AFU, and makes his move then. Based on his statements, all the options are currently on the table from peace to a nuclear standoff.

Considering the above, it’s very worrisome that it now looks that NATO is an aggressor, and not simply an erratic, because this carries a grave risk of a nuclear confrontation. Recent comments, including those by Finnish PM Petteri Orpo, Estonian PM Kaja Kallas (she seems utterly deranged) and the French President Emmanuel Macron, imply that there’s a plan, or it’s in the making, to escalate the war in Ukraine to a conflict between Russia and NATO during the next few years. This would carry a very high risk of a nuclear war.

Unless ordinary people start to object this madness, I fear that the future, of all humanity, starts to look rather bleak. Regardless, have a great weekend.

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